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 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
 This chapter traces the evolution of the partnership between the 
Employment Service (ES) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) pro-
grams in the United States from its origins. Using primary sources, 
we analyze the early actions of federal policymakers to facilitate 
cooperation between the two programs to meet economic exigen-
cies, grapple with political cronyism, and surmount legal barriers. 
We also discuss factors that caused changes in the ES-UI partnership 
over time. We identify reasons that cooperation started eroding in the 
1980s, and explain why there has been a continuous decline in service 
availability ever since. Reviewing evidence on the eff ectiveness of 
in-person employment services for UI benefi ciaries, we suggest ways 
to revitalize the ES-UI partnership. We explore the source of Wagner-
Peyser Act funding, how it was formalized, then eroded, and how it 
can be renewed. 
The public ES and UI programs are essential to maintain-
ing robust American labor markets. Established by the Wagner-
Peyser Act of 1933 and the Social Security Act of 1935, respectively, 
these programs were the fi rst permanent federal laws addressing the 
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problem of unemployment in an American industrial society where 
workers were separated from the sustenance provided by the land. 
Both programs were structured to expand economic security using 
an approach to federalism that instituted a federal-state cooperative 
system. The federal government provides grants-in-aid (referred to 
as “grants”) to states to administer the UI and ES programs under 
state laws. With these programs, workers who lose their jobs invol-
untarily are provided temporary partial wage replacement to help 
support themselves and their families while looking for new jobs, 
and employment services are provided to speed the return to work.1 
Employers benefi t from the UI program by keeping skilled workers 
attached to their businesses during periods of slack product demand.2 
They also benefi t from the ES program by having a reliable means 
of canvassing local registries for qualifi ed new workers and ensur-
ing that UI benefi ciaries are actively seeking work. By emphasizing 
reemployment for benefi ciaries, the social insurance character of UI 
is maintained and the moral hazard risk is reduced—that is, the risk 
that payment of cash benefi ts during periods of joblessness might 
unnecessarily prolong unemployment. 
Four broad topics are explored in this chapter. First, we describe 
the origin and evolution of the ES-UI partnership and the decisive 
eff orts undertaken to unify the two programs at the federal and state 
levels. Second, we explain how the partnership matured as policy-
makers sought to secure adequate funding to support the national sys-
tem of public employment offi  ces (now referred to as American Job 
Centers [AJCs]) through cycles of policy preferences. Third, focusing 
primarily on ES, we show how the partnership has acquired added 
service mandates over the past four decades despite chronic reduc-
tions in ES resources. These reductions in real funding have curtailed 
staff -assisted assessments (interviewing, testing, and counseling), job 
search assistance (JSA), and job fi nding and placement services, as 
well as diluted ES-UI coordination.3 We explain that while technology 
has off ered enormous job fi nding capabilities, it often has not worked 
for many long-term UI claimants, who are exhausting unemployment 
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benefi ts at higher rates before securing new work. We summarize 
several research studies providing evidence that off ering employment 
services for UI claimants is highly cost eff ective. Finally, we suggest 
policy remedies to revitalize the ES-UI partnership based on the pro-
posals of others and our own research, thoughts, and experience with 
the programs.
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ES-UI PARTNERSHIP 
The initial impetus for a social security program in the United 
States emerged in the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century. 
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, key elements of social 
insurance were enacted into federal law. A national network of pub-
lic employment offi  ces was established, along with a UI program for 
partial income replacement to the unemployed that provided a safety 
net for jobless workers (Reich 2010, p. 44). Curt Harding, an early 
policymaker of the Utah Employment Security Agency, summed 
up the economic security history of that period, saying it “was part 
of a reform that was needed in order that the free enterprise system 
might continue” (USDOL 1985, p. 1). While some European coun-
tries nationalized industries and others expanded public assistance 
to the needy, the United States took a diff erent approach to estab-
lishing a social insurance system. Within the panoply of other New 
Deal reforms and programs, the introduction of ES and UI programs, 
dubbed “employment security” programs, helped sustain American 
capitalism.4 
In the late 1930s, federal ES and UI policymakers sought to oper-
ate as partners out of necessity. A report from the Committee on Eco-
nomic Security (CES), prepared by a White House working group, is 
the seminal document on social insurance policy in the United States.5 
Baldwin (1993, pp. 31–32) observes that the 1935 CES report recom-
mended a program of employment assurance before suggesting a UI 
program. In Baldwin’s view, this was an attempt to emphasize reem-
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ployment after job loss and resulted in ES offi  ces being designated 
as the points of service for UI claimants.6 Thus, the expectation of 
continued public support for reemployment eff orts during periods of 
UI receipt gave birth to the ES-UI partnership. 
BEGINNINGS OF THE ES AND FUNDING
Ordered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 to immedi-
ately revitalize the federal U.S. Employment Service (USES), which 
was originally set up in 1918 to staff  the buildup of defense industries 
in the fi rst world war (O’Leary and Eberts 2008, p. 2), U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor (USDOL) Secretary Frances Perkins instructed staff  
members to begin helping states enact ES laws consistent with the 
Wagner-Peyser Act. State agencies were established and became 
affi  liated with the USES system, using federal ES grants to support 
operations (Perkins 1946, p. 179). 
Under the Wagner-Peyser Act, the network of ES offi  ces was 
administered by states and funded by the federal and state govern-
ments on a 50-50 matching basis. During the initial stage of USES 
growth, recruitment of unemployed workers to fi ll job openings for 
public works projects7 necessitated setting up temporary federal 
reemployment offi  ces (called National Reemployment Service [NRS] 
offi  ces). These offi  ces were fi nanced 100 percent by the federal gov-
ernment. To supervise the national buildup of NRS offi  ces, a separate 
division of NRS was organized within USES (USDOL 1953, p. 12). 
As states affi  liated with USES and received Wagner-Peyser
Act ES grants, NRS offi  ces were either closed or transferred to 
state administration. In December 1933, there were 158 ES offi  ces 
and 3,270 NRS offi  ces nationwide. By June 1938, the balance was 
reversed, with 1,263 ES offi  ces and only 188 NRS offi  ces. From 
1933 until the early part of fi scal year (FY) 1938, the ES system was 
fi nanced by fi ve diff erent sources. The biggest source was NRS allot-
ments from federal public works appropriations, but there were also 
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state and local government appropriations, Wagner-Peyser Act ES 
grants, and facilities or staffi  ng contributions from local governments 
(USDOL 1953, p. 13). 
RECESSION OF 1937–1938 SPURS ES-UI PARTNERSHIP 
Unemployment declined in 1934, the year after President Roo-
sevelt took offi  ce, but recovery from the Great Depression was not 
continuous.8 A new economic downturn started in May 1937 and 
lasted until June 1938. Unemployment reached 20 percent, with 11 
million unemployed in 1938 (Burns 1956, p. 324; Waiwood 2013). 
The economic recession of 1937–1938 had an enormous impact on 
the emerging federal-state ES and UI programs. The Social Security 
Board, which administered the nascent UI program, and USDOL, 
which administered the fl edgling ES system, began discussions to 
gather resources to help states expand the network of ES offi  ces.9
The CES report had advised states to pay unemployment benefi ts 
only through ES offi  ces pursuant to provisions in the Wagner-Peyser 
Act (CES 1935, p. 19),10 and immediately after the Social Security 
Board was organized, it accepted that advice (Blaustein 1993, p. 156). 
The Board believed that idled claimants should be off ered publicly 
posted job openings. It also sought to bolster the public image of UI 
as an earned entitlement rather than a dole involving a means test and 
therefore opted not to pay benefi ts out of state welfare offi  ces. That 
decision fl owed from an overarching New Deal policy that sought 
to establish permanent federal-state programs to ameliorate unem-
ployment, and fi ndings from the CES report, which saw unemploy-
ment benefi ts as a temporary income support paid only when suitable 
jobs were not available. These are foundational elements of social 
insurance distinct from relief. Every state provided for ES offi  ces to 
administer UI payments. 
USDOL and the Social Security Board agreed in 1937 that an 
expanded system of ES offi  ces was needed to meet the demands of 
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the UI program. Expansion came after intense discussion among poli-
cymakers involving valid misgivings. Some USDOL policymakers 
believed too rapid a buildup of state ES offi  ces could lead to hiring 
incompetent ES staff , which could result in bias and a lack of profes-
sionalism in administration and have severe adverse public conse-
quences. This perspective was not without merit, given the patronage 
systems operating in many local and state governments at that time. 
After state ES laws11 were enacted, Secretary Perkins’s hand-
picked director of USES, Frank Persons, proceeded cautiously to 
partner with some states.12 There were nine states in 1937 where affi  l-
iation with USES was withheld and distribution of Wagner-Peyser 
Act ES grants and the closing of NRS offi  ces were delayed, in most 
instances because of political issues surrounding the administration 
of ES agencies (USDOL 1937a).13 For example, in Massachusetts, 
where the ES director was an appointee of Governor James Curley, 
Director Persons believed the Massachusetts appointee was too weak 
to resist patronage pressures (McKinley and Frase 1970, p. 295).14 
Most striking was that, of the 35 states affi  liated with USES in 1936, 
only nine were attempting to provide services statewide.15 The other 
26 states had not yet set up ES offi  ces outside large cities (USDOL 
1953, p. 12). 
Frank Persons and others argued against consolidated ES and 
UI activities because it might be harmful to placement activities and 
hinder participation by employers. Although there was sympathy for 
this view, it was ultimately not shared by Secretary Perkins and the 
Social Security Board (McKinley and Frase 1970, pp. 298, 305). The 
relationship between ES and UI raised a host of new policy issues in 
public administration. These issues necessitated an exchange of view-
points among remarkably capable New Deal public offi  cials. 
Policymakers understood that the UI provisions of the Social 
Security Act would radically expand the mission and volume of ES 
operations. The policy dilemma facing USDOL and the Social Secu-
rity Board in 1937 was that the Wagner-Peyser Act did not authorize 
money for UI activities or the carrying out of UI activities by the 
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state ES (USDOL 1937b, p. 5). However, the Social Security Act did 
permit the funding and conducting of UI activities by the state ES. 
The administrative challenges were to obtain agreement between the 
secretary and the Board on how to connect federal ES and UI funds, 
and then fi gure out how states were to coordinate ES and UI functions 
within ES offi  ces. Meeting the challenges required a formal collabo-
ration between two federal agencies, USDOL and the Social Security 
Board, to successfully enlarge the national network of ES offi  ces and 
coordinate the UI and ES programs. 
POLITICAL CONTEXT AND AGREEMENT OF 193716 
Getting government executive agencies to collaborate is always 
a challenge. Perhaps more so in this instance because when Congress 
enacted the Social Security Act, it authorized the Board as an inde-
pendent agency, outside USDOL. According to Perkins, legislators 
made the Board independent because they did not want USDOL to 
acquire additional responsibilities and resources (Perkins 1946, p. 
300). 
Therefore, the political context for the agreement included the 
following: 
• The 1937–1938 recession was causing unemployment to rise 
again, and there were fears of another structural breakdown. 
Thirty-two states were to start paying unemployment benefi ts 
in 1938 (USDOL 1937b).17 Payment of UI benefi ts in each 
state required establishing standard administrative procedures 
for determining eligibility, paying benefi ts, and certifying that 
claimants had conducted job searches. 
• The recession produced rising political pressure to increase ac-
cess to services for the jobless. There were large service gaps 
in helping the unemployed fi le UI claims and locate work, and 
Wagner-Peyser Act ES funds alone could not expand service 
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capacity for the burgeoning UI program (McKinley and Frase 
1970, p. 306). The fl edgling ES system required rapid estab-
lishment and expansion of ES offi  ces statewide in each state. 
• A novel fi nancial relationship between two federal agencies, 
USDOL and the Board, was essential for the success of the 
untested federal-state ES and UI programs. 
A policy agreement, dated March 30, 1937, between Secretary 
Perkins and Board Chair Arthur Altmeyer established coordination 
and integration of the functions between the two federal agencies. 
The agreement created a type of “unifi ed service and fi nancing pact,” 
but it did not govern state operations. According to the agreement, 
two federal agencies, the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation 
(within the Board) and USES (within USDOL), were to 
• “act as if they were a single agency” with respect to all matters 
aff ecting state ES agencies, including state plans funded under 
the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Social Security Act (USDOL 
1937c, 1953, p. 19); 
• expand state ES offi  ces and prepare for the payment of UI 
benefi ts (USDOL 1937b); 
• regard the state agency ES and UI systems as a “unifi ed ser-
vice” (USDOL 1937d, e); and 
• use UI grants under Title III of the Social Security Act to 
expand public ES offi  ces, administer benefi t payments, and 
maintain standards of USES (e.g., merit standards); such UI 
grants were in addition to ES grants (USDOL 1937d). 
The Board interpreted the requirements of the Social Security Act 
to allow UI grants to support ES. This interpretation was based on the 
intent of the CES report and the Board’s subsequent selection of state 
ES offi  ces to administer UI payments (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 
104).18 An opinion from the Comptroller General of the United States 
in July 1937 affi  rmed the Board’s decision (Atkinson, Odencrantz, 
and Deming 1938, p. 55). USDOL and the Board required states to 
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appropriate funds to match Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants before they 
could receive UI grants.19 
The Secretary-Board Agreement formalized the ES-UI partner-
ship. It was an improvised interdepartmental arrangement, which 
allowed UI grants to supplement ES grants and state resources to 
build and maintain a national ES system.20 Under the Secretary-
Board Agreement, both ES and UI services were provided jointly in 
ES offi  ces. While ES and UI functions were unifi ed at a single point 
of service, ES and UI grants were not comingled. Both USDOL and 
the Board made federal grants available during FYs 1936 to 1938 to 
establish and maintain ES offi  ces and to coordinate ES and UI activi-
ties. During 1938, 9.2 million initial UI claims were fi led, and ES 
made 2.7 million nonagricultural job placements (Haber and Kruger 
1964, p. 29). By the end of FY 1939, the plan to expand ES offi  ces 
was completed in the 48 states, District of Columbia, and territories 
of Alaska and Hawaii (USDOL 1953, p. 13).21 
FINANCING AND ORGANIZING THE PARTNERSHIP 
The Wagner-Peyser Act provided ES grants to states, which they 
were required to match, to administer state ES systems. Title III of the 
Social Security Act provided nonmatching UI grants (and still does) 
to states to administer state UI laws and, as a result of the Secretary-
Board Agreement, to fi nance the ES system.22 Between 1938 and 
1941 about 85 to 90 percent of the costs for administering ES offi  ces 
were fi nanced through UI grants. Overall, between 90 and 95 percent 
of the entire costs of maintaining all state ES offi  ce systems were 
fi nanced by the federal government under the Wagner-Peyser Act and 
the Social Security Act. Between January 1942 and November 1946, 
war-time mobilization of civilian labor required federalization of the 
state ES systems, and the total cost of administering ES offi  ces was 
paid from federal general revenues. When Congress returned the ES 
to federal-state administration after the war, it waived the state ES 
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matching requirement. The 1947 Labor-Federal Security Appropria-
tion Act and subsequent laws (Friedman 1948, p. 17) provided 100 
percent federal funding of ES administrative costs until 1950, when 
the Wagner-Peyser Act was amended to permanently eliminate the 
matching provision.23 
Locating the ES and UI programs in USDOL to overcome federal 
and state structural barriers to fortify the two programs’ partnership 
proved challenging during the Truman administration.24 Ultimately, 
in August 1949, under Reorganization Plan No. 2, the Bureau of 
Employment Security that had responsibility for both programs was 
permanently transferred from the Federal Security Agency to USDOL 
(USDOL 1955, p. 53). 
EARMARKING REVENUES FOR 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
 Struggles in obtaining adequate appropriations for ES and UI 
after World War II led to legislative proposals starting in 1949 to ear-
mark the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) receipts solely for 
the purpose of employment security—that is, ES and UI. Earmarked 
funds were thought to be less susceptible to budget manipulations. 
Not until the Employment Security Administrative Financing Act 
of 1954 (P.L. 83-567) was the proposal enacted into law to earmark 
FUTA receipts. However, FUTA receipts continued to be deposited 
in general revenues of the U.S. Treasury, and appropriations for ES 
and UI administration continued to be paid from general revenues. 
The 1954 law did provide, however, that excess tax receipts (rev-
enues over expenditures) at the end of each FY were to be credited to 
the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) (Haber and Murray 1966, pp. 
404–405). 
Since the 1954 amendments, administrative grants for both ES 
and UI have been fi nanced from FUTA revenues. In the ensuing 
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years, however, USDOL budget requests for ES and UI administra-
tive grants continued to be cut by Congress. Thus, in 1959, the Eisen-
hower administration proposed yet another change in the law that 
would require Congress to fi nance employment security administra-
tion directly from the UTF. Amounts equal to FUTA revenues could 
then be placed in the UTF, from which the grants to states could be 
appropriated with an adequate balance maintained as a reserve. The 
president’s budget message for FY 1961 argued that “employment 
security programs would be fi nanced in essentially the same way as 
other major social insurance programs” (Federal Reserve Archive 
1960).
During the Eisenhower presidency, many of the early architects 
of the federal and state ES and UI programs remained active in policy 
making. Based on their experiences, they sought to strengthen the 
ES-UI partnership into the future. Congress approved the proposed 
Eisenhower reform with overwhelming bipartisan support; the Social 
Security Amendments of 1960 were enacted on September 13, 1960.25 
Title V of the 1960 amendments, the Employment Security 
Administrative Financing Amendments, established a new federal 
Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA) within the 
UTF.26 Under the law, FUTA payroll taxes paid by employers to the 
U.S. Treasury are deposited in the ESAA, and about 20 percent of 
those receipts today are allotted to the Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Account (established in 1970). Funds to administer 
state ES and UI programs are expended directly from ESAA, rather 
than from the general revenue fund (Miller 1997, p. 359). 
The 1960 amendments transformed the fi scal federalism of the 
ES and UI programs. Since then, FUTA revenues have not only been 
earmarked, but they go directly into the UTF and also come out of 
the UTF as ES and UI grants. Federal ES and UI laws, federal-state 
grant agreements, and state operating plans set forth conditions for 
administration of the grants. The 1954 and 1960 revisions to the UTF 
remain in place, and over time, have safeguarded the framework of 
the ES-UI partnership. 
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CHANGES IN THE LABOR FORCE 
The role of the ES expanded in the second half of the twentieth 
century to serve more of the economically disadvantaged, who had 
little or no previous work experience and diffi  culty entering the labor 
market. Because added funding for ES was needed to serve the disad-
vantaged, advocates began to consider new ES funding sources and 
arrangements. They argued for the use of monies from federal general 
revenues to augment ES appropriations and expand service capacity. 
During mid-century, the national eff ort to enact the fi rst large-scale 
public job training program also emerged.27 Ruttenberg and Gutchless 
(1970, p. 73) typifi ed the sentiments of some job training advocates, 
observing: “Trust fund fi nancing has provided a continuity and stabil-
ity that was essential to the steady development of the employment 
service.” They and others argued that grant funds from FUTA should 
be used to assist job seekers with prior attachment to the labor force, 
and that additional grant funds to serve the disadvantaged and other 
groups should be drawn from federal general revenues to fi nance 
some ES administration. 
The 1970 Employment Security Amendments (P.L. 97-373) 
provided that the ES grants include a “mix” of monies from FUTA 
and general revenues. Based upon USDOL policies to meet statutory 
requirements, the percentage of FUTA monies in the mix is deter-
mined by the percentage of persons in UI-covered employment. In 
1973, the source of funding for ES grants was 85 percent from FUTA 
and 15 percent from general revenues. A series of changes in this 
formula followed. In 1975, the grant mix was set at 86 percent from 
FUTA and 14 percent from general revenue. In 1976, the proportions 
were changed to 87 percent and 13 percent, respectively. In 1978, the 
proportions were adjusted to 92 percent from FUTA and 8 percent 
from general revenue. Before the summer of 1980, the proportions 
were again revised to 97 percent from FUTA and 3 percent from gen-
eral revenues, and they have remained unchanged since then (Lubin 
1980, p. 877). 
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Over the next 30 years, national policy shifted about whether 
UI and ES services should be delivered jointly or separately at local 
offi  ces. In 1980, a report by the National Commission on Unemploy-
ment Compensation (NCUC) made recommendations to revitalize 
the ES-UI partnership by enhancing the ES program. The report spec-
ifi ed that for ES to serve as the prime federal and state labor exchange 
and provide job search and work test services to UI claimants, the 
Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants to states had to be increased. To accom-
plish essential ES objectives, the report proposed that annual federal 
grants be suffi  cient to fund at least four ES staff  positions for each 
10,000 local members of the civilian labor force (NCUC 1980, pp. 
137, 141). No action by the president or Congress was ever taken on 
these NCUC policy recommendations.28 
ES AND UI AS INTERDEPENDENT PROGRAMS 
From FY 1994 through FY 2000, under the “One-Stop” initiative, 
states received supplemental USDOL grants totaling $825 million to 
consolidate fragmented workforce development delivery systems. 
Interestingly, one of the federal principles for the states’ receipt of 
the new funding was integrated services (Balducchi, Johnson, and 
Gritz 1997, p. 476; Balducchi and Pasternak 2001, p. 145),29 and the 
meaning of integrated services became a source of policy diff erences 
within USDOL because it concerned how local offi  ces would be 
funded. Unlike the position held by federal UI policymakers in 1937, 
this time federal UI policymakers did not want state UI agencies to 
assume large costs for the upkeep of the consolidated One-Stop cen-
ters that housed multiple program partners. USDOL UI policymak-
ers who previously had been reluctant to sponsor new telephone and 
Internet claims processes, changed position to avert a potential UI 
resource grab by One-Stop operators. USDOL began distributing sup-
plemental UI grants to states for new telephone and Internet technolo-
gies, which resulted in relocating the vast majority of state UI staff  
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out of local offi  ces and into detached call centers. Currently, most UI 
staff  members are not located in physical AJCs, although states are 
required to provide access to claims services at these centers (Wand-
ner 2010, pp. 198–199). 
With implementation of the One-Stop grant initiative, the Clinton 
administration next sought to enshrine in law the One-Stop approach 
in the delivery of workforce development programs. Codifi ed in 
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, this reform brought 
together the ES, UI, and job training systems into a single One-Stop 
delivery system, without reapportioning state control of ES and UI 
programs and local control of job training programs (Balducchi and 
Pasternak 2001, p. 156). 
The ES-UI partnership weakened during the WIA era (1998–
2014), mostly because of inadequate funding for the ES program 
under the Wagner-Peyser Act. This happened despite the introduc-
tion of new federal programs requiring ES-UI cooperation to assist 
the increasing numbers of dislocated UI benefi ciaries. These included 
the Worker Profi ling and Reemployment Services30 (WPRS) program 
(1994), and the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment initiative 
(2005), which was replaced in 2015 by the Reemployment Services 
and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA)31 program. Over the past four 
decades, the president’s annual budget requests have been insuffi  cient 
to provide adequate Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants to states,32 and sub-
sequent underfunding by Congress has widened the fi ssure between 
ES and UI program activities. 
Despite these challenges, the union of ES and UI remains intact 
in federal statutes, and the operating procedures of the ES-UI partner-
ship are still faithful to its founding principles (USDOL 1955, p. 12), 
which 
• guarantee that impartial services will be delivered by compe-
tent state government professionals who are free of patronage 
or private interests; 
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• pledge that the prospect of suitable jobs will be found for UI 
claimants as soon as possible, so that in many cases the pay-
ment of benefi ts will be unnecessary; 
• assure cooperation between staff  members performing job 
fi nding and placement, and those performing claims activities 
to satisfy state laws requiring that UI benefi ciaries must be 
able and available to work or they may be disqualifi ed if they 
refuse suitable work without good cause; 
• state that when a claimant has refused a referral or a job based 
upon a referral, ES must report the facts to the UI claims staff  
to determine whether a benefi t disqualifi cation should be im-
posed; and 
• assure employers that claimants who are required to do so ful-
fi ll their responsibility to seek work and that employers have a 
reliable means to obtain qualifi ed workers. 
The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) of 2014 
retained the WIA’s One-Stop concept along with the distribution of 
authority for ES and job training between state and local entities. 
However, WIOA did collapse the WIA categories of core and inten-
sive services into the single category of “career services.” Career ser-
vices are typically the same as Wagner-Peyser Act ES services. The 
key diff erences between the structure of ES and WIOA are that ES is 
under the administrative control of state workforce agencies, where 
resources can be reassigned within states, and services are mostly 
delivered by merit-based government employees, retaining the assur-
ance of impartiality sought by the founders of the ES and UI pro-
grams. Grants (derived largely from FUTA) are awarded for adminis-
tering ES services throughout each state, with distinct responsibilities 
for UI claimants. Thus, ES funds enable governors to align statewide 
economic development with recruitment and job placement services 
without destabilizing local WIOA resources in any area. In contrast, 
grants (derived from general revenue) for administering WIOA career 
services and job training are mostly under the control of local work-
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force development boards, and WIOA services are delivered by pri-
vate and public employees. 
EVIDENCE OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
In this section, we examine selected studies evaluating the cost-
eff ectiveness of ES programs. Syntheses of the best evidence about the 
cost-eff ectiveness of ES for UI benefi ciaries may be found in O’Leary 
(2006) and Wandner (2010). Studies since the 1980s have shown that 
many dislocated, experienced workers actually only require adequate 
unemployment benefi ts and JSA to return to employment (Corson et 
al. 1989; Jacobson et al. 2004; Johnson et al. 1983). In addition, ran-
dom trials testing strategies to renew linkages between ES and UI 
have estimated that closer cooperation results in shorter unemploy-
ment durations and lower UI benefi t payment costs (Corson, Long, 
and Nicholson 1985). 
These results mean that conservation of UTF reserves through 
reduced joblessness can be achieved by providing job fi nding and 
placement services and exposing UI claimants to suitable jobs. This 
is particularly true for younger and dislocated UI claimants. Analyz-
ing data from Washington State, Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury 
(2016) fi nd that for dislocated UI claimants the work test reduced 
time to reemployment by one to two quarters and increased post-UI 
job tenure by about two quarters.33 
Other evidence can be found in several USDOL-sponsored 
studies. A demonstration in Wisconsin (Almandsmith, Adams, and 
Bos 2006) tested a services regimen that included joint ES-UI staff  
interviews with UI claimants, JSA, UI eligibility reviews, and staff -
assisted job referrals. Using a quasi-experimental methodology, the 
researchers found that UI durations were shortened by 0.9 week, rela-
tive to the comparison group of other UI claimants. More evidence of 
eff ective ES activities comes from three evaluations of reemployment 
and eligibility assessments (REA) involving random trials (Benus et 
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al. 2008). In Nevada, REA led to signifi cantly shorter UI durations 
and lower benefi t amounts where treatment group UI claimants col-
lected 3.13 fewer weeks and $873 lower total benefi t amounts than 
their non-treatment peers (Michaelides et al. 2012; Poe-Yamagata et 
al. 2011).34 
INADEQUATE ES FUNDING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Because of chronic underfunding of the Wagner-Peyser Act 
ES grants to states, the types of eff ective, staff -assisted ES services 
needed to return the unemployed or underemployed to work are not 
always available at the AJCs.35 These grants have been underfunded 
in spite of research showing that assessment, JSA, and job fi nding 
and placement services can be highly cost-eff ective ways of reducing 
joblessness. 
Since program year (PY) 1984, Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants to 
states have remained stagnant or decreased in nominal terms.36 Addi-
tionally, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 capped 
a shift in federal policy that tightened rather than expanded access 
to UI benefi ts. This was manifested in tougher initial and continu-
ing eligibility conditions at the state level (Blaustein 1993, pp. 262–
263).37 This shift was the result of federal fi scal policies that promoted 
reduction in the size of government, opposition to tax increases, and 
devolvement of social programs to states. Resistance by some states to 
tax hikes in recent years also has resulted in unprecedented reductions 
in unemployment benefi t durations. The potential federal funding of 
ES-UI programs was further squeezed with the drop in 2011 of the 
FUTA tax rate from 0.8 percent to 0.6 percent. Likewise, the federal 
UI wage base, the wage cap per employee used to calculate employ-
ers’ tax contributions to support the ES-UI programs, has remained at 
$7,000 since January 1, 1983. After enactment of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1939, laws to increase the federal UI wage base to 
support these vital programs have been enacted only three times, all 
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under Republican administrations, in 1970 (P.L. 91-373), 1976 (P.L. 
94-566), and 1982 (P. L. 97-248).38 
The tightening of state UI eligibility conditions and reduction in 
funds for ES services occurred in a period of enormous technological 
advancements. This leap in technology enabled states to move to high 
volume mainframe and distributed computer processing and Inter-
net services without workload disruptions. Sometimes, particularly 
in rural areas, this gave a false impression that access through com-
puter-assisted services always resulted in eff ective service interven-
tions (Dunham et al. 2005). With federal budget constraints and the 
rampant use of technology-based self-services, there has been precip-
itous erosion in staff -assisted ES job fi nding and placement services. 
Moreover, utilization of technology-based services appears to have 
expanded during the Great Recession. According to state workforce 
agency administrators, more than 80 percent of the 45 respondents to 
a 2012 National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA) 
survey funded by the Urban Institute (Wandner 2015, pp. 156, 163) 
reported that they had increased rather than cut computer-assisted 
services. Throughout this period, regular UI average durations and 
exhaustion rates have been trending upward, suggesting a possible 
cause and eff ect. 
From 1993 until the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century, the 
WPRS program required states, as an unfunded mandate, to provide 
additional reemployment services to UI claimants likely to exhaust 
benefi ts. As a consequence, ES services in states were widely under-
funded and WPRS claimants underserved.39 
Both the executive and legislative branches of the federal govern-
ment have contributed to the underfunding of the ES program in recent 
decades. Neither the president’s annual budget requests to Congress, 
nor separate Congressional appropriation actions have provided ade-
quate funding. FUTA provides a statutory mechanism to fully fund 
ES services, and funds are contained in the UTF for this purpose, but 
it has not been adequately used to support the program. On the other 
hand, since 1962, there have been fi ve major federal job training laws 
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enacted, including WIOA most recently, and each incarnation has 
included changes to state and local delivery arrangements.40 Every 
one of the fi ve public job training programs has been funded from 
general revenues with discretionary Congressional appropriations. 
Public job training has received policy attention and funding; but it is 
not an entitlement, nor does it have a statutory funding mechanism. 
In contrast, the Wagner-Peyser Act ES program, which has an exist-
ing institutional structure for funding, has regularly lacked suffi  cient 
funds despite the fact that they have already been paid for by employ-
ers through FUTA taxes. 
Most industrialized nations provide a free public employment 
service as a right to all citizens. Indeed, these developed nations and 
many middle-income nations are signatories to the 1948 International 
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 88 on public employment ser-
vices (ILO 1948). Convention 88 asserts that all labor force members 
should have the right to free labor market information and job match-
ing services as a means to social participation. Although the United 
States is not a signatory to ILO Convention 88, it has respected the 
principle of the convention that all nations “shall maintain or ensure 
the maintenance of a free public employment service” (ILO 1948, 
article 1). President Eisenhower asserted, “[S]tate employment secu-
rity offi  ces are important for a smoothly operating free labor market 
in a growing economy” (Federal Reserve Archive 1960). Through the 
ES, the United States provides a public exchange at no cost to job 
seekers.  Furthermore, the ES has a statutory funding mechanism to 
ensure Americans have access to a free public employment service. 
However, the mechanism has not worked well in recent years. Pol-
icy action should be taken to ensure adequate funding under FUTA. 
Additional factors for ES budget formulation might be established 
by USDOL to improve justifi cations to the Offi  ce of Management 
and Budget and Congress for increases in annual appropriations.41 In 
an American society where work is the avenue to self-suffi  ciency, a 
free and eff ective public labor exchange should be available to all job 
seekers. 
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Because Wagner-Peyser Act ES grant funds to states have 
declined in nominal terms since PY 1984, their real value through PY 
2015 has dropped by more than half (Figure 3.1). For 2015, it would 
have taken funding of $1.47 billion to have maintained the 1984 real 
level of spending.42 Workers and employers need to be more aware of 
the role ES contributes to the smooth functioning of the labor market 
and to the integrity of the UI program. Some states have taken lim-
ited measures to make up for portions of these ES grant shortfalls by 
augmenting federal funding through special assessments or by tap-
ping UI funds. As of 2015, 30 states have provided supplementary ES 
funding (USDOL 2016a, Table 2-17, pp. 2-31 to 2-32). In addition, 
based on the annual NASWA survey of state workforce agencies, 
state supplementary spending on ES totaled more than $150 million 
(NASWA 2016). This is compelling evidence that state workforce 
agency administrators value ES programs for their customers.
Figure 3.1  Wagner-Peyser Funding for Employment Services in Millions 
of Nominal and Real Dollars, 1984 to 2015 (1984 = 100)


















Real Funding (1984 = 100)
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OPPORTUNITY FOR ES-UI 
PARTNERSHIP REVITALIZATION 
Over the years, the ES-UI partnership has ebbed and fl owed. 
Historically about 40 percent of the ES registrants for services have 
been UI claimants. In the Great Recession, the highest number of 
ES registrants in any year was 22,447,124 in PY 2009, and of those, 
10,712,573 were UI claimants, totaling 47.7 percent of all registered 
ES job seekers (USDOL 2009). 
Workforce changes over several decades and new work arrange-
ments, including in today’s so-called gig labor market, have resulted 
in more workers being at risk for joblessness. Currently, fewer than 
one in three unemployed workers receive unemployment benefi ts, and 
a record high 38 percent of workers exhaust benefi ts. After the Great 
Recession, nine states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, 
Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, and South Carolina)—mostly as 
a result of debt due to inadequate benefi t fi nancing—reduced their 
maximum unemployment benefi t durations to less than 26 weeks, 
ranging from 12 to 25 weeks.43 The number of weeks available in 
four of those states (Georgia, Florida, Kansas, and North Carolina) is 
based on a sliding scale governed by the states’ unemployment rates 
(The White House 2016). 
The decisions by some states to reduce UI benefi t durations have 
adverse eff ects on both claimants and job seekers who have exhausted 
unemployment benefi ts. Reductions in UI receipt by unemployed 
workers will not reduce the number of job seekers who need ES ser-
vices. Business downturns or dislocations will cause many claimants 
in states with reduced durations of benefi ts to exhaust benefi ts, but 
many will continue to be job seekers who need an array of job fi nding 
and placement services. Shortened maximum durations of UI make 
provision of early ES services even more important. For example, 
in PY 2014, UI claimants accounted for 37.3 percent of all job seek-
ers registered with ES—a 10 percentage point decline from PY 2009 
(USDOL 2014). Although much of this decline may be attributed 
86   Balducchi and O’Leary
to improved economic conditions, if additional states reduce their 
maximum duration of benefi ts, the percentage gap between UI claim-
ants and ES job seekers may widen, but the necessity of providing 
employment services to UI exhaustees will remain.   
POLICIES TO REVITALIZE THE ES-UI PARTNERSHIP 
In June 2016, the Center for American Progress (CAP), the 
National Employment Law Project (NELP), and the Center on Pov-
erty and Inequality (CPI) of the Georgetown University Law Center 
proposed improvements in unemployment protections for workers 
and enhancements of the ES-UI partnership. They called for a $1 
billion increase in Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants and a $535 million 
increase in RESEA above the 2017 presidential budget request (West 
et al. 2016, pp. 20–21). 
If the current administration is successful in stimulating aggregate 
demand through tax reform or other measures, then domestic labor 
demand also is likely to increase. Many businesses with job openings 
will require some staff -assisted ES recruitment services. This possible 
surge in labor demand is an ideal time for policymakers to revitalize 
the ES-UI partnership. We off er four policies for consideration. 
Increase Annual Wagner-Peyser Act ES Grants to States 
 In FY 1981, regular Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants totaled $781.4 
million. That year ES grants served 16.5 million job seekers (USDOL 
1982, pp. 48–49). Had ES received only increases in annual funding 
that maintained the real level of funding over the years, the amount 
would have been $1.47 billion in FY 2015 instead of the $664 million 
appropriated by Congress. We therefore support the funding increases 
proposed by CAP, NELP, and CPI. 
In a report issued by the Brookings Institution, Jacobson (2009, 
p. 25) estimates a cost of $383 per UI claimant to institute call-in 
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notifi cations and provide JSA services. Adjusting for annual infl a-
tion, the cost rises to $430 per UI claimant in 2016. Based on his-
toric usage, $430 seems to be a reliable estimate for the average cost 
per UI claimant to receive staff -assisted assessment and job search 
services.44 Using the $430 amount, the proposed $1 billion in added 
Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants could provide job search activities to 
an added 2.3 million UI claimants (or the long-term jobless who have 
exhausted their unemployment benefi ts). In FY 2015, for example, 
only 16 percent of UI claimants were scheduled for RES or RESEA 
eligibility and job search services (USDOL 2016b, p. 37). Using PY 
2014 national ES data, 5,411,656 UI claimants were registered with 
ES, and of those, 1,845,036 received job search activities (USDOL 
2014). An additional $1 billion could have increased the receipt of job 
search activities for UI claimants from 34.1 percent to 77 percent.45 
Furthermore, amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act in WIOA 
in 2014 expanded ES assistance to UI claimants, added work test 
responsibilities to include making eligibility assessments, and broad-
ened ES referrals and assistance to training and employment oppor-
tunities.46 Logically, additional ES responsibilities should give rise 
to increases in annual Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants to states, but no 
increases in ES grants to states have thus far been proposed. 
Raise and Index the FUTA Taxable Wage Base and Make the ES 
Grants Budget Mandatory 
Americans should have a right to a vibrant and free public 
employment service. We propose restoring the funding capacity of 
the Wagner-Peyser Act ES program by raising and indexing the FUTA 
taxable wage base as well as moving the Congressional allocation 
derived from funds in the ESAA for state ES grants from the discre-
tionary to the mandatory side of the federal budget. 
To secure additional Wagner-Peyser Act ES fi nancing, the FUTA 
wage base could be tied to one-third of the Social Security taxable 
wage base or set equal to the average weekly wage in UI covered 
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employment. Either rule would secure the foundation for Wagner-
Peyser Act ES grant fi nancing and help insulate it from the politics of 
the budgetary request and appropriation processes. 
Create a Contingency Fund for the Wagner-Peyser Act 
ES Program 
Starting in FY 1950, the federal budget for state UI grants has 
included a contingency fund to cover state workload expenditures 
above the expected level. Supplementary grants to states from this 
fund are based on the number of UI claims fi led, claims paid, and 
state salary increases above the expected level (USDOL 1957, p. 6). 
USDOL should create a companion ES contingency fund so that as 
UI workloads climb, so does ES funding under the Wagner-Peyser 
Act in order to serve the additional ES workload. 
Establishing an ES contingency fund would ensure that as state 
UI workloads go up, funds above budgetary levels for Wagner-Peyser 
Act ES services would also rise proportionally. These additional ES 
funds would be provided to serve added UI claimants and provide to 
them cost-eff ective, staff -assisted ES job fi nding and placement ser-
vices. Also, such funds could be used to administer increased work 
test activities and referrals to appropriate training. A federal-state 
work group should be formed to design and test an ES contingency 
model to determine its eff ectiveness and exportability. 
Increase Uniformity of State UI Provisions 
Reforms of the Social Security Act and FUTA and state UI 
fi nancing rules will be more successful if UI eligibility provisions 
that are truly national in scope become federal conformity require-
ments where states are compelled to enact companion laws.47 Exam-
ples include not disqualifying individuals for benefi ts who leave work 
to care for immediate family members who are ill or disabled, or to 
accompany spouses who are relocating, and program alternatives 
such as short-time compensation and self-employment assistance. 
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This will ensure that conditions for receipt of benefi ts are uniform and 
lessen the advantage of one state over another as a cost of doing busi-
ness. Likewise, such federal policy mandates will advance national 
economic security outcomes, increase recipiency, strengthen the ES 
and UI partnership as an economic stabilizer, and expand labor mobil-
ity and the equal treatment of workers. 
SUMMING UP 
The ES-UI partnership is rooted in permanent authorizing stat-
utes, an identical fund source, common rules for state administration, 
and interdependent practices to guard against improper payments 
and to expose claimants to suitable job openings. This partnership is 
central to the success of the public workforce system. Over the past 
several decades, the ES has been consistently underfunded, thereby 
weakening the ES-UI partnership, despite research evidence that 
demonstrates its value to reducing unemployment durations. During 
recent recessions, federal policies have increased emergency unem-
ployment benefi ts and job training, but they have by and large ignored 
long-term underfunding of Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants, and Con-
gress has been inattentive to the adequacy of ES fi nances. Similarly, 
state governors and interest groups have not advocated for ES fund-
ing suffi  ciently to revitalize the ES-UI partnership. 
 In this chapter, we explored the origin and objectives of the 
ES-UI partnership. We reviewed the early actions by ES and UI fram-
ers to forge an interdependent relationship between the two programs. 
At the outset, creative fi nancing and strict rules for professionalism 
were required to properly launch and maintain employment security 
programs. A statutory system for cooperation and fi nancing was set 
by 1960, but it has atrophied—along with the ES and UI partner-
ship—mostly because of inattention and underfunding of the ES pro-
gram. We also reviewed research that demonstrates the eff ectiveness 
of ES and the reliance of the ES and UI programs on each other to 
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satisfy social insurance principles. We described how amendments 
to the Wagner-Peyser Act in WIOA broadened ES activities, and we 
proposed a path to revitalizing the long-standing ES-UI partnership. 
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1. The ES provides employment services without cost to job seekers—both 
UI benefi ciaries and other individuals.  
2.  Preventing unemployment was one of the original objectives of the UI 
policymakers, and maintaining employer–employee attachments by pre-
venting dispersal of an employer’s workforce was the practical policy 
enunciated by USDOL (Blaustein 1993, pp. 43–64).  
3.  On average, just over half of UI claimants each year obtain at least one 
staff -assisted ES service (West et al. 2016, p. 15).  
4.  The term employment security was the invention of Arthur Altmeyer, 
chairman of the Social Security Board. President Roosevelt’s Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 1 of 1939 created the Federal Security Agency. Within 
the agency, a new bureau was formed containing the Social Security 
Board and the U.S. Employment Service. Altmeyer named it the Bureau 
of Employment Security to unite the ES and UI programs (Blaustein 
1993, pp. 175–176). Employment security is likely a derivative of social 
security and economic security (the original term used by Roosevelt to 
introduce social insurance).  
5.  The president initiated CES to study social insurance at the sugges-
tion of the Secretary of Labor (Perkins 1946, p. 279). The membership 
included the Secretaries of Labor, Agriculture, and Treasury, the Attor-
ney General, and Federal Relief Administrator.  
6.  See also Balducchi (2011) for an analysis of CES’s recommendations.  
7.  These projects were launched under the National Industrial Recovery 
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Act, Public Works Administration, Civil Works Administration, and in 
1935, Works Progress Administration.  
8. This section draws from Friedman (1948).  
9.  Of the over 30 states in March 1936 that had affi  liated with USES, only 
11 had matched funds to the upper limit of federal Wagner-Peyser Act 
ES grants available to them (McKinley and Frase 1970, p. 302).  
10.  The Social Security Act requires that benefi ts must “be paid through 
public employment offi  ces or such other agencies as the Social Security 
Board may approve.” There was little early resistance to the Board’s 
mandate. In one instance, the South Dakota legislature adjourned in 
early 1939 without appropriating funds to match the Wagner-Peyser 
Act ES grant. The state proposed to pay unemployment benefi ts through 
the state welfare offi  ces instead of state ES offi  ces. The Board withheld 
South Dakota’s UI administrative grant until the state came into com-
pliance. By September, the legislature provided matching funds for the 
Wagner-Peyser Act, state ES offi  ces were reopened, and the UI grant 
resumed (Rubin 1983, p. 175).  
11. State ES laws included authorization for or appropriation of matching 
funds. Legislative acceptance of the Wagner-Peyser Act was included 
in the UI laws of Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming (USDOL 
1937a).  
12.  Incrementalism is a trait of federalism. Stepwise adoption of ES by states 
and USDOL validation was a harbinger for later ES-UI policy initia-
tives. For example, the national WPRS system was enacted into federal 
law in 1993 and required concomitant state compliance. Not until June 
1996 did all states implement WPRS systems (Robinson 1996, p. 11).  
13. The states were Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, Illinois, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, Minnesota, and Colorado.  
14.  From the outset, a professional cadre of employees of state government 
was indispensable to avert favoritism or corruption by private interests 
in classifying and referring job seekers. After state ES laws were enact-
ed, USDOL continued to uphold standards of professionalism. The Iowa 
ES agency in March 1935 was warned that not adhering to merit stan-
dards would jeopardize its Wagner-Peyser Act ES grant. In August 1935, 
USDOL suspended Missouri’s Wagner-Peyser Act ES grant for violation 
of merit staffi  ng standards. It wasn’t until 1998 in Michigan that another 
state’s Wagner-Peyser Act ES grant was suspended for violating federal 
standards (Balducchi and Pasternak 2004; Michigan v. Herman 1998).  
15.  By May 1937, 44 states had adopted UI laws.  
16.  We refer to this agreement as the Secretary-Board Agreement.  
92   Balducchi and O’Leary
17.  Thirty-two was the number of states used in memoranda prepared by 
the Social Security Board. In fact, benefi ts became payable in 22 states 
in January, with an additional eight states by the end of 1938 (USDOL 
2017). The Social Security Act delayed initial UI payments in each state 
for two years to build reserves. In August 1936, Wisconsin became the 
fi rst state to pay unemployment benefi ts.  
18. The Board also cited testimony of January 21, 1935, of Edwin Witte, 
executive director of CES, before the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee (McKinley and Frase 1970, p. 302).  
19. A technical resolution adopted in May 1937 governed the operating 
mechanics of the Secretary-Board Agreement (USDOL 1937d).  
20. A UI grant for the ES was fi rst made to Wisconsin in 1936 and to other 
states in mid-1937 (Atkinson, Odencrantz, and Deming 1938, p. 197).  
21.  For the two FYs, 1938 and 1939, the Board increased its share of the 
total costs of the ES from 60 percent ($14.3 million) in FY 1938 to 80 
percent ($25 million) in FY 1939 (Haber and Joseph 1939, p. 29).  
22.  Parts of this section are drawn from U.S. Congress (1950).  
23.  The cost to states for administering ES offi  ces from 1933 through 1950 
in the years when matching was required never exceeded 10 percent 
(U.S. Congress 1950). Federal law has never prohibited supplementa-
tion of funds by states to support the ES system.  
24.  In July 1946, the Social Security Board was abolished. Its functions, 
including UI administration, were transferred to the new Social Secu-
rity Administration in the Federal Security Agency (FSA). During the 
presidential campaign of 1948, over President Truman’s veto, Congress 
transferred the ES program from USDOL to FSA. Thus, the USES and 
UI programs were combined in the Bureau of Employment Security, but 
not in USDOL.  
25.  In contrast to recent partisanship in tax policy, HR 12580 (P.L. 86-778) 
also raised the federal payroll tax from 3.0 to 3.1 percent without a 
change to the allowable 2.7 percent off set (USDOL 1985, p. 48). The 
bill sponsored by a Republican administration received 369 House 
votes to approve, with 236 Democrats voting for it. In the Senate, the 
bill received 74 votes to approve, including 43 Democrat votes (Social 
Security Administration 2016). In 2017, a tax under FUTA was levied 
on employers at a rate of 6.0 percent on wages up to $7,000 a year paid 
to an employee. The law provides a credit against federal tax liability of 
up to 5.4 percent to employers who pay state UI taxes. Thus, employers 
pay an eff ective federal tax rate of 0.6 percent, or a maximum of $42 per 
covered employee per year.  
26.  Sections 901(a) and (c) and 903 (c), Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1103). 
27.  The rise of automation as a means of production began to trigger dis-
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location of workers. The needs of the dislocated and disadvantaged 
prompted the birth of public job training. Under the Manpower Devel-
opment and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962, ES and UI played vital roles. 
The state ES screened and referred job seekers to training institutions, 
and UI administered MDTA allowance payments (Wandner, Balducchi, 
and O’Leary 2015).  
28.  In 1982, James Rosbrow, executive director of NCUC, told an author 
of this chapter that the report’s recommendations were not acted upon 
because of the publication’s timing. It was issued during the 1980 presi-
dential election, and the outcome of that election resulted in a rollback 
of federal policy making (Rosbrow 1982).  
29.  Supplemental USDOL grants for the development of state One-Stop 
delivery systems were authorized under the Wagner-Peyser Act, but the 
source of funds was general revenue. The other One-Stop principles 
were universality, customer choice, and performance-driven/outcomes 
based.  
30.  Reemployment services is defi ned as employment services for individu-
als who have work experience and seek new work.  
31.  The RESEA program requires UI claimants to report in person to AJCs 
and receive one-on-one reviews of eligibility for UI, assessing their abil-
ity and availability for work, and referrals to reemployment services or 
training. When the WPRS program was launched in March 1994, the 
inclusion of UI eligibility reviews was considered, but obtaining funding 
and setting up the framework would have delayed state implementa-
tion. Eligibility reviews, thus, were not included in the original WPRS 
process (USDOL 1994). Later eff orts to introduce such reviews lacked 
policy support, until the launch of the REA initiative. However, the 
ultimate aims of WPRS and RESEA are similar—reduced duration and 
faster job placement. In FY 2015, USDOL merged aspects of the two 
eff orts. Claimants determined most likely to exhaust benefi ts under state 
WPRS systems and veterans receiving unemployment benefi ts are the 
primary groups directed to RESEA. For a discussion of other aspects 
of the WPRS and RESEA, see Wandner (2010) and USDOL (2015a).  
32.  Grants for the ES refer to annual formula grants, which support staff -
ing and infrastructure of state labor exchange operations. They are dis-
tinct from episodic federal grants for reemployment services under the 
RESEA program.  
33.  The work test is an ES responsibility under the Wagner-Peyser Act, sec-
tion 7(a)(3)(F). Provision of the work test is not in WIOA. The Middle 
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 amended the Social Secu-
rity Act at section 303(a)(12) to require that UI claimants be able to 
work, available for work, and actively seeking work.  
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34.  Material in this section was derived from Wandner, Balducchi, and 
O’Leary (2015). Some research suggests that shorter unemployment 
durations result from the threat of requiring participation in services 
rather than due to the value of the services. For example, Johnson and 
Klepinger (1994) asserted that responses to enhanced work search sup-
ports in a Tacoma experiment happened after assignment but before 
service participation; Black et al. (2003) found a similar response after 
Kentucky UI benefi ciaries were assigned to WPRS. However, the cited 
Nevada experiment provided persuasive evidence that the reemploy-
ment services in REA had strong positive eff ects separate from any 
threat eff ect of the eligibility assessment. 
35.  One result of underfunding has been cutbacks by some states of physi-
cal local offi  ces and staff -assisted ES services. For example, since 2011 
the governor of Iowa has closed 36 offi  ces and reduced state workforce 
agency staff  by 27 percent, which makes it hard “to provide employment 
services to individual job seekers” (Des Moines Register 2017).  
36.  Appropriations for ES and UI had been funded on the basis of FYs, and 
they jointly developed annual state plans of service. Amendments to the 
Wagner-Peyser Act in 1982 (P.L. 97-300) required appropriations for 
ES in FY 1985 and thereafter to be made available for obligation on a 
PY basis, and the joint development of state ES plans of service with 
agencies of the Job Training and Partnership Act. The PY begins July 1 
of the calendar year and ends June 30 of the following year. Beginning 
in 1976, the FY begins October 1 of the calendar year and ends Septem-
ber 30. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-96/pdf/STATUTE
-96-Pg1322.pdf (accessed May 23, 2017). 
37. See  https://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/PL97-248.pdf (accessed 
February 15, 2017).  
38.  In 1939, two federal laws were enacted that aff ect the ES-UI partnership. 
P.L. 76-1, untitled, transferred Title IX of the Social Security Act to the 
Internal Revenue Code, Chapter 23, FUTA. The Social Security Amend-
ments (P.L. 76-379) limited the tax base under FUTA to the fi rst $3,000 
of a covered worker’s earnings (USDOL 1986, p. 43).  
39.  In 1997, USDOL staff  began drafting internal papers arguing for 
increases in Wagner-Peyser Act ES funds to serve dislocated UI claim-
ants. Separate approvals were required from Employment and Training 
Administration, other offi  ces in USDOL, the Offi  ce of Management 
and Budget (for inclusion in the President’s annual budget request), and 
Congress. It took three years to gain concurrences. For PYs 2001–2005, 
Congress added $35 million to the Wagner-Peyser Act ES appropriation 
to serve WPRS UI claimants, but these funds were inadequate. Subse-
quently, the George W. Bush administration abandoned supplementation 
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and cut Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants. In 2009, the Obama administra-
tion, under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, achieved 
a one-time increase in Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants of $400 million, 
available through PY 2010, which included $250 million targeted for 
reemployment services to UI claimants.  
40.  O’Leary, Straits, and Wandner (2004) review the fi rst four federal job 
training laws.  
41.  Section 901(d) (4) of the Social Security Act establishes the factors for 
requesting funds for Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants. These factors include 
“the relationship between employment subject to state laws and the total 
labor force in the United States, the number of claimants and the num-
ber of job applicants, and such other factors as he fi nds relevant.” Thus, 
federal law permits development of modernized factors to strengthen the 
case for increased ES grants.  
42.  The implicit price defl ator value for 2015 was 197.97, with the base year 
1984 equal to 100.00. The nominal 1984 level of funding for Wagner-
Peyser Act programs was $740 million.  
43.  In 2013, Illinois resumed a 26-week maximum UI duration.  
44.  The ES provides job fi nding and placement services to all job seekers 
who ask for them. In PY 2014, the cost per individual for ES was $45.74. 
This rate included individuals receiving self-service through virtual tools 
and those receiving staff -assisted ES services (USDOL 2016b, p. 53).  
45.  The actual 1,845,036 UI claimants in receipt of job search activities 
added to an estimated 2,325,000 UI claimants in receipt of job search 
activities totals 4,107,036 UI claimants.  
46.  Sections 7(a)(3)(F) and (G) of the Wagner-Peyser Act.  
47.  The National Governors Association’s principles of state-federal rela-
tions endorse federal action for problems that are truly national in scope 
(National Governors Association 2017).  
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